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ophy and the Christian Faith (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), pp. 
241-78. 
11. He is drawing on a discussion by Max Black in "The Identity of Indiscernibles" in 
his Problems of Analysis (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953), pp. 80-92 (to which 
Hughes provides no reference). The fact that Black's example is of a world containing 
only two qualitatively alld relatiollally indiscernible spheres seems to make it inappropri-
ate for Hughes's purpose here: "We might suppose that each was made of chemically pure 
iron, had a diameter of one mile, that they had the same temperature, color, and so on, and 
that nothing else existed. Then every quality and relational characteristic of the one would 
also be a property of the other" (p. 83). 
12. Hughes comes close to admitting this when he says "the Father and the Son are 
discernible, ill that the Son is generated by the Father and the Father is not" (p. 214; 
emphasis added). 
13. We are grateful to Christopher Hughes for corresponding with us about some of the 
issues in his book. 
Mencius and Aquinas: Theories of Virtue and Conceptions of Courage, by 
Lee Yearley. Volume Two in the series, "Toward a Comparative Philosophy 
of Religions," Frank E. Reynolds and David Tracy, editors. Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1990. Pp. xiv and 280. 16.95 (paper). 
JEAN PORTER, University of Notre Dame 
In his introduction, Frank Reynolds describes the aim of the series, "Towards 
a Comparative Philosophy of Religions," as "the development of a new kind 
of comparative philosophy of religions that is global in its perspective and 
in tune with contemporary philosophical developments and issues" (xi). At 
least some of the philosophical developments to which Reynolds refers have 
made this a daunting task indeed. In particular, the growing consensus 
against epistemological foundationalism has raised questions as to whether 
it is possible genuinely to understand, much less to assess, intellectual and 
moral traditions radically different from the observer's own. Seen in this 
light, earlier efforts to spell out a universal core of beliefs and values embed-
ded within the world's great religions are likely to appear as drastic oversim-
plifications at best, distorting projections of the observer's own convictions 
at the worst. 
And yet, it is hard to know what alternative we have. We could follow the 
example of those anthropologists who offer detailed "thick" descriptions of 
the traditions of other societies, without attempting to identify any common 
ground between them and us. But while this approach avoids the pitfalls of 
a false universalism, it does not offer much in the way of a basis for dialogue 
among those who have been formed in disparate traditions. And given the 
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realities of global interdependence, the need for such a dialogue has never 
been more apparent. 
In his comparative study of the theories of virtue and the notions of courage 
contained in the works of Aquinas (d.1274) and the Chinese Confucian phi-
losopher Mencius (4th century B.C.E.), Lee Yearley sets two goals for him-
self. He offers an illuminating analysis and comparison of two central 
thinkers from two very different traditions, and in addition, he also develops 
a methodology for comparative religious ethics that allows for real compar-
isons and assessments, while still acknowledging the incommensurability of 
at least some of the main religious traditions. And of course, these two aims 
are not unconnected. Yearley has not only taken two premodern thinkers as 
the objects of his research, he has also taken much of his methodology from 
one of them. Specifically, his comparative work draws on Aquinas' theory of 
the virtues and his use of analogical analysis to provide a model for bringing 
together seemingly disparate concepts under one overall scheme. 
As Yearley acknowledges, Aquinas' moral theory may seem to be "a very 
odd place" to look for a model for comparative religious ethics (181). But 
further reflection indicates that Yearley's move is not as odd as it may at first 
appear to be. Aquinas' own task as a moral theorist required him to bring 
together diverse and sometimes incommensurable traditions and thinkers, 
including Aristotle and his Islamic and Jewish interpreters, Augustine and his 
many interpreters, and a wide range of other classical and Christian sources. 
And as YearJey argues, Aquinas' analysis of virtues in terms of their parts, 
and his use of analogical analysis of key concepts, enabled him to bring 
together in creative and unexpected ways the diverse conceptions of human 
flourishing that he found in his sources. He was of course attempting to 
develop a unified theoretical synthesis, whereas the modern comparativist 
seeks understanding without necessarily moving towards a synthesis. But 
Yearley argues, brilliantly and convincingly, that Aquinas' method can none-
theless suggest a way of approaching the comparative study of religious ethics 
today. 
He summarizes Aquinas' theory of virtue as follows: "Aquinas argues that 
a virtue can have three parts. First are the qualities, the component parts, 
that help shape a single virtue's action: for example, memory and foresight 
in prudence. Second are those distinct virtues, allied virtues, that share the 
essential characteristic of the primary virtue but fail to express it fUlly, even 
if they may express other qualities of the primary virtue more fully than it 
does ... Third are those separable and substantially different activities of a 
virtue, the types of a virtue, that appear when the virtue operates in distinct 
spheres of life; for example, military and political prudence ... The idea that 
virtues have parts, as well as most other aspects of Aquinas's attempts to 
harmonize different thinkers' ideas on virtues, rests on one major foundation: 
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the theoretical procedures or performances involved in the analysis of ana-
logical predication" (184-185). By means of this apparatus, Aquinas is able 
to bring together accounts of virtue that seem at first glance to have little in 
common, or even to be in opposition. For example, he brings together 
Augustine's account of patience with Aristotle's very different account of cour-
age by taking Augustinian patience to be a component or allied part of Aristo-
telian courage, and he then further extends Aristotle's conception of courage to 
include both martyrdom and endurance through an analogical extension of 
the concepts of death and warfare that are central to that conception. 
Yearley appropriates Aquinas' methods in a context provided by the phi-
losopher Robin Horton. According to Horton, in attempting to understand any 
extended tradition, we must distinguish between primary theories, which 
systematize the observations and data that accumulate in any society, and 
secondary theories, which attempt to explain the world of natural observa-
tions in terms of unseen or abstract realities, for example, ideal forms or 
benevolent spirits. To this division of kinds of theories Yearley adds a third, 
namely, the practical theory, which for him includes any effort to derive 
norms for action from one's primary and secondary theories. 
At the level of primary theories Mencius and Aquinas unsurprisingly have 
a great deal in common; for example, their most basic accounts of the place 
of sexual desire and fear in human life are very similar. At the level of 
secondary theories they are again similar in some respects; for example, they 
would agree that there is a given human nature, defined in part in terms of 
unrealized capacities which depend for their actualization on the action of a 
power that transcends the human. But resemblances at this level are thin; that 
is to say, they are so abstract, or else have to do with such a narrowly 
circumscribed area of life, that they tell us very little about either Mencius 
or Aquinas, or about the practical concerns central to. each. Thus, when we 
ask just how Mencius and Aquinas understand the relation between human 
and transhuman forces in the development of human character, it becomes 
clear that each thinker spells out that relationship in terms of conceptions, of 
numinous psychophysical energy (ch'i) or of divine grace (gratia), that only 
make sense within the wider intellectual framework that each one develops. 
If the fully textured secondary theories of each are not taken into account, 
therefore, the thin similarities at this level may conceal the profound differ-
ences between the Chinese philosopher and the Italian theologian. 
But when we turn to the practical theories of Mencius and Aquinas, a more 
interesting pattern of differences and similarities emerges. At this level, each 
thinker works out an account of human flourishing, and the kinds of virtues 
productive of human flourishing, that goes well beyond the crude folk psy-
chology of his received primary theories of human action and motivation, 
and yet is developed in relative independence of his secondary theory. (This 
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is of course a controversial claim, at least as applied to Aquinas, but 1 believe 
YearJey is correct.) Hence, if we are to identify significant similarities be-
tween the theories of Mencius and Aquinas, we will be most likely to be 
successful when comparing their practical theories of human flourishing and 
its corresponding virtues. And Yearley argues that this is indeed the case. 
Although they are clearly dissimilar in many ways, Mencius' and Aquinas' 
accounts of the virtues, analyzed along the lines suggested by Aquinas' ana-
logical theory of virtue, reveal unexpected and illuminating similarities. For 
example, while the notion of dispositions is more congenial to Aquinas' 
theory than to Mencius', it nonetheless serves to illuminate a range of notions 
in the latter; in turn, Mencius' reflections on automatic reactions can help to 
clarify Aquinas' accounts of intelligent dispositions, habits, tendencies, and 
invariant reactions. This means of analysis therefore serves to clarify the 
thought of two very different moral theorists, to bring to light unexpected 
similarities between them, and to aid us in our own efforts to think through 
the issues that they raise. 
It is unfortunate that a book of this sort, which crosses so many disciplinary 
lines, will probably be neglected by many "pure" scholars in the fields of 
moral philosophy, religious ethics, and the history of moral thought. YearJey 
has written what is one of the most significant books in recent years in all of 
these areas. His approach will of course be controversial, not least because 
he contends that the moral thought of at least some religious thinkers can be 
understood apart from their religious theories, to some degree at least. But 
the questions that his book raises are a mark of the cogency and importance 
of his arguments. His treatments of Mencius and Aquinas are always illumi-
nating, and while 1 did not agree with his interpretations of Aquinas at every 
point, his treatment of Aquinas' theory of the virtues is by far the best that I have 
ever seen. (I am not competent to evaluate his interpretation of Mencius.) Even 
more importantly, he has managed to offer a method for the comparative study 
of religious ethics that is at least prima facie plausible, and whether it is 
finally judged to be successful or not, that in itself is a rare and important 
achievement. No serious scholar of moral thought in any of its forms can 
afford to neglect this seminal book. 
Being and Goodness: The Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philo-
sophical Theology, edited by Scott MacDvnald. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 1991. Pp. ix and 328. $43.95 (cloth)/$14.95 (paper). 
Reviewed by DAVID BURRELL, C.S.C., University of Notre Dame. 
As the title suggests, this collection testifies to the renewed interest in medi-
eval philosophical theology. The subtitle is also suggestive, reminding us that 
